claustrophobia that comes of dense, reeling repetition: 'me', 'I', 'I', 'my self '; Satan seems hemmed in by the constraints of his own anaphoric structure as much as by the consequences of what he has done. He is not, however, the only character who displays such emotional legibility: Adam's passionate ratiocination as he confronts the possibility of losing a fallen Eve is a powerful example of active thought structured in language:
and as fond of the kind of subversive and destabilising wordplay that leaves traces in the text, but with a more settled corpus (not beset, that is, by the textual cruxes that have occupied scholars of Shakespeare since the early eighteenth century), and a less anonymous ideology; Milton is a strident presence in both his polemical and poetic writings. 5 The immediate concerns of this essay are, however, rather different from Crane's. I want to shift the focus from the mind of the writer to the thinking that takes place in the text, by looking again at a bold early attempt at reception and reconception: Richard Bentley's 1732 emended edition of Paradise Lost. This eccentric, hubristic work has attracted a great deal of attention from critics as a scholarly curiosity, but its interest as an exercise in profoundly active reading is less frequently remarked. It is my contention that Bentley's interventions, almost always misguided as they are, represent a combative but conversational engagement with Milton's text which recognises the dynamic qualities of its rhetorical texture. In its reluctance to let pass any instance of powerful figuration, Bentley's edition serves to draw attention to moments where the rhetoric of Paradise Lost achieves an understanding which bypasses ordinary, rational stages of thought. By exploring Bentley's reasons for undertaking this project and the principles on which his intellectual interaction with the poet is founded, I hope to offer a sense of the edition as a reading that -despite its evident failuresis both more engaged and more sympathetic than its critics like to acknowledge.
Richard Bentley was a classical scholar of great distinction, an early pioneer of modern practices of textual criticism, the truculent and litigious master of Trinity College, Cambridge. 6 He was a subtle theologian, and an influential man: apart from his own achievements, he was active in his patronage of younger scholars, and an important figure in the early history of the Cambridge University Press. Above all, though, it was Bentley's brilliant speculative reconstructions of fragmented ancient texts, sense wrested from the depredations of time, transmission, and other accidents of history, that gave him his reputation as a pre-eminently learned and ingenious academic in the early years of the eighteenth century. He helped to formulate a kind of scholarship that recognised the flaws and failings in the manuscripts of Greek and Latin works, and sought to 5 Stephen M. Fallon gives a detailed account of how this self-image is established and promulgated in Milton's Peculiar Grace: Self-Representation and Authority (Ithaca, NY 2007). 6 There has been no scholarly biography since that of J. H. Monk, The Life of Richard Bentley, D.D. (London 1830); but see also Hugh de Quehen, 'Richard Bentley', DNB online, from which these details are derived.
supply their deficiencies with a method of inspired conjecture, grounded in prodigious research and certified by an ideal of literary taste. In the notes to his edition of Horace, in fact, he notoriously declared that conjecture was a more certain method than manuscript reading, and that the reason and sense of the passage itself were a stronger guide than a hundred manuscripts. 7 For Bentley, the frustrating uncertainties of an incomplete text, words obscured or mistranscribed, lines damaged or lost, could be triumphantly overcome by an act of sympathetic conception: he claimed for himself a creative integrity, and was widely acknowledged by his contemporaries as a scholar of luminous intelligence and rare achievement; he was invited to give the first Boyle lectures in 1692, and made master of Trinity in 1700, at the age of 38. This is not how his reputation has survived to us. In part, that is because Bentley had the misfortune to be right in a quarrel with the wittiest men of his day, a victory which hardened into a polar opposition of ethos and attitudes towards the professionalisation of learning. In the last years of the seventeenth century he undertook to demonstrate that the Epistles of Phalaris, much praised and hotly defended as genuine by the bellelettristic politician Sir William Temple, were in fact forgeries. Temple had cited the Epistles in an essay as evidence of the superior taste and achievements of the ancient writers, and was made to look distinctly foolish by their exposure in Bentley's scrupulously learned Dissertation as spurious. 8 Temple at one time employed as secretary a young man called Jonathan Swift, and Swift had a friend called Alexander Pope: these two spent the next thirty years or so happily belabouring Bentley with relentlessly inventive satire and dextrous malice. He makes a poor showing in the last passages of Swift's Battle of the Books as 'the most deformed of all the Moderns', splenetic and cowardly, stealing the armour of the ancients while they sleep; he is widely believed to be an important inspiration for the fictional character Martinus Scriblerus, pedant, scourge, and paradigmatic exemplar of the worst abuses of learning. 9 The culmination of the The reference is to the two poles of Bentley's career: the 1712 edition of Horace, which was highly successful and widely influential, and the 1732 Paradise Lost, which was not. Although Pope was said to have admired the latter work in private, it is his public scorn with which critical opinion has tended since to concur.
11 For this extraordinary undertaking is the other major reason for Bentley's loss of credit and credibility: it is a fascinatingly misguided attempt to apply the divinatory methods that had served him so well with the Latin and Greek writers of the distant past to the work of an author who had scarcely been dead fifty years.
Bentley's edition of Paradise Lost has become something of a by-word for bad editorial practice. To justify his textual interventions, which are very numerous and extensive for what is now regarded as a relatively stable text, Bentley constructs the figure of an 'Editor'. This shadowy individual, unattested elsewhere, is said to have imposed on the elderly Milton sufficiently to introduce 'monstrous Faults' into the manuscript of the poem without his knowledge: 'the suppos'd Friend (call'd in these Notes the Editor)', Bentley writes, 'knowing Milton's circumstances … thought he had a fit Opportunity to foist into the Book several of his own Verses, without the blind Poet's Discovery'. 12 No motive other than a general malignancy is offered for this deception, and its circumstances are highly questionable: Johnson calls it 'A supposition rash and groundless, if he thought it true; Other opportunities for the corruption of the text are also identified, an inattentive amanuensis and the poet's own increasing frailty chief among them. These fictions and figments allow Bentley considerable licence, and barely a page of his edition goes by without changes of words and phrases, or the excision of lines, and sometimes whole passages; the poem is printed intact but with disputed readings italicised or asterisked, and alternatives provided alongside and explained in two hefty columns of notes below. The experience of reading is a strange one; Bentley claims his alterations are 'suggested, but not obtruded to the Reader' by this method of presenting them, but the eye is continually pulled away from the text by this orthographic sleeve-tugging: it clamours for an active process of reading, a considered assent to or dismissal of each utterance of this dissonant voice at the margins. Verdicts are delivered, too, in distractingly strident terms: 'Very dry this, and jejeune', he remarks; the poem is variously accused of 'swoln and empty Bombast', 'puerile Fancy', and 'Nonsense outragious'. 14 Bentley's mark is very clear upon the text; the irony that he, of all Paradise Lost's early readers, most resembles the interfering 'Editor' he excoriates has not been lost on subsequent commentators.
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What reasons Bentley might have had for undertaking this edition have never been satisfactorily explained, and an explanation is probably needed: 'the key question', as Kristine Haugen frames it, 'is not how a hopeless pedant like Bentley could believe he had the right to edit Paradise Lost, but rather why a celebrated classical scholar like Bentley should have bothered to edit Paradise Lost'.
16 He was in the last decade of an illustrious career spent pioneering textual methods in the ancient languages, and this project was, to say the least, something of a departure. Bentley's usual method was not the extended essay but the commentary, the note, the emendation; leaving aside his motives for deciding to edit a poem in the vernacular (which may well have included a desire to promulgate his approach more widely), why should he have chosen a work with a comparatively stable textual history, published in two editions during the author's lifetime and explicitly with his consent? This was certainly not a whim arbitrarily fixed on and swiftly carried out, despite Bentley's claim in the preface to have 'made the Notes extempore, and put them to the Press as 13 soon as made'. 17 The quality of immediacy that the edition possesses does not reflect any lack of consideration or undue haste in composition. There are extant two copies of the poem that bear marks of Bentley's working: the first is the two-volume Tonson edition of 1720 held in Cambridge University Library, which has been known about for some time, and which supports, or at least does not contradict, Bentley's account of swift and spontaneous work. 18 Relatively recently, however, an annotated copy of the second edition of 1674 has surfaced (it is now in the library of Trinity College, Cambridge). 19 This volume contains extensive marginal notes in Bentley's hand, and clearly represents an earlier stage of his thought: some emendations are seen here half-developed, and others do not make it into the 1732 edition at all. At II. 43, for example, where Moloch is described as 'the strongest and the fiercest Spirit', Bentley has underlined 'strongest' and provided a series of possible alternatives in a vertical column in the right-hand margin: 'stoutest', 'angriest', 'boldest', 'formost', 'proudest', 'forwardest', '& fiercest', the last of which of course Milton got to first. These suggestions have been struck through, however, and 'strongest' survives unscathed into the 1732 edition. Taken together, these two volumes witness a long and careful engagement with the project that the careless pose of the preface tries to efface: this, for Bentley, was a serious undertaking many years in gestation.
A number of more or less plausible explanations for the eccentric decision to edit Paradise Lost have been offered, among them increasing senility (a view all but invalidated by the evidence of the annotated 1674 edition), the distractions of an ongoing court battle with the Fellows of Trinity, even the desire to perpetrate an elaborate practical joke on the academy.
20 This is to succumb to an easy incredulity, however, and to overlook some more positive reasons for Bentley's choice. As an epic, Paradise Lost was at least generically appropriate for a classical scholar; it was also beginning to attain an elevated, quasi-scriptural status that Bentley's editorial ministrations could both benefit from and advance. Marcus Walsh has put forward the suggestion that this textually revised edition of Paradise Lost was a substitute for the great work Bentley confidently advertised, but never completed: a resolved and reconstructed edition of the Old and New Testaments, textual cruxes sorted out and divine truth thereby allowed definitively to shine forth. 21 Bentley's letter on the subject to William Wake, Archbishop of Canterbury, is characteristically assured: I find I am able (what some thought impossible) to give an edition of the Gr[eek] Test[ament] exactly as it was in the best examples at the time of the Council of Nice … So that that book, which, by present management, is thought the most uncertain, shall have a testimony of certainty above all books whatever; and an end be put at once to all var. lectt. [variant readings] now or hereafter.
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Perhaps Bentley's hitherto dauntless self-belief failed him for once, and he saw in this Christian epic an honourable alternative to the larger project; or perhaps he did simply believe that Paradise Lost was great, but flawed: that his editorial labours could rescue the poem from damaging imperfections of coherence and expression, and present it successfully improved and restored to future generations.
It may be, however, that it was another quality of Milton's writing that was of decisive importance for Bentley: its personality. As Haugen notes in an important new study, 'Bentley was seemingly incapable of writing in any mode but the competitive and polemical', and Milton, beginning to be widely acknowledged as a national poet approaching Shakespeare's stature, but with a far more sharply defined presence in his works, must have seemed an attractive prospect as an interlocutor. 23 Milton was, indeed, the first English poet to construct a clear self-image and establish a narrative of literary development through autobiographical asides in his published works. From his assertion in an early pamphlet that an aspiring poet 'ought himself to be a true poem, that is, a composition of the best and honorablest things', to the confessional invocations that punctuate the epic he wrote twenty-five years later, Milton demonstrated a strong and consistent belief in the identity of his words and the mind that composed them: 'his writings repeatedly insist on the inseparability of the author from his work and from the image of the poet constructed through the 21 For Paradise Lost's enshrinement during this period as a 'national scripture', see Walsh, Shakespeare, Milton & Eighteenth-Century Literary Editing, pp. 53-110. 22 The work'. 24 For a scholar with Bentley's distinctively adversarial outlook, Paradise Lost must therefore have offered the promise of a lively engagement. He set out to correct the 'corruptions' of the poem, which he identified as coming from four possible sources: printers' mistakes, neglectful, day-dreaming amanuenses, the devious insertions of an imaginary editor, and (though this is often played down) lapses in Milton's own judgement. An extract from the preface offers an idea of the principles on which the work is constructed: 'though the Printer's Faults are corrigible by retrieving the Poet's own Words', Bentley writes, 'by Sagacity, and happy Conjecture: and though the Editor's Interpolations are detected by their own Silliness and Unfitness … yet Milton's own Slips and Inadvertencies cannot be redressed without a Change both of the Words and Sense'. 25 Bentley's editorial practice, in other words, was predicated on the assumption of a deep intellectual intimacy with the writer whose works he sought to emend, such that he could sense immediately what had and had not sprung from that particular creative mind as he conceived it. Milton's strong authorial presence in his poem complicates this process by standing as a distinct alternative to Bentley's strident editorial persona: it is this that gives the edition both its provocatively antagonistic dynamic and its air of strange immediacy.
To think about this exchange in terms of the cognitive rhetoric it acknowledges and exploits might seem at first anachronistic and counterintuitive, given both the modernity of the terminology and Bentley's notorious insensitivity to figuration and verbal ornament. As Mark Turner points out, however, the framework of such ideas is familiar from classical times, and the underlying notions would not have been strange to either Milton or Bentley: 'The cognitive study of art, language, and literature is concerned with patterns of thought and patterns of expression and the nature of their relationship', Turner writes; 'In this way it has a basis, intellectually and sometimes wittingly, in the work of Greek rhetoricians on patterns of thought and of expression.' 26 The upshot of this is to recognise that 'poetic' expression (metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and so forth) is not simply aberrant or optional -the translation of something literal and anterior into different, more difficult terms -but an unsimplifiable representation of ordinary structures of thought. Some things cannot be expressed otherwise than figuratively. Bentley might have recognised the idea, but it is doubtful whether he would have allowed its truth. It is not that he cannot identify figurative expressions: indeed, it is almost a critical commonplace that his unerring instinct for the unusual in Milton's poetic is one of the chief interests in his edition. Bentley seems, however, to have been possessed of a curiously literal turn of mind: he is genuinely irked by things that do not make proper sense, and so can often be used as a
27 A more recent critic, John Hale, draws our attention to the specific focus of these impatient outbursts: Bentley, Hale observes, 'betrays a surprising insensitivity to rhetorical figures'.
28 Walsh, too, notices the great critic's tropic blinkers: 'Bentley regularly objects to manifestations of the figurative in Paradise Lost. Extended similes are hooked. Metaphoric expressions are questioned.' 29 Bentley, in short, is almost fanatical in his hostility to modes of thought and expression that transgress his ideal of literal transparency. 'Lofty Nonsense', he comments on Belial's rather mild figurative transport in Book II: 'What's Black Insurrection? Are these Insurrections of several Colours?' The expression, he is sure, 'cannot be metaphorical': Bentley's deliberate rejection of the notion here suggests not that he cannot but that he will not read rhetorical code, preferring to dismantle what he refuses to understand ('insurrection' becomes 'infuscation', which means 'darkened or dusky condition'; as ever, tautology is an acceptable alternative to figurative expression) . 30 This gives rise to an interesting situation. Where Milton is at his most rhetorically brilliant, Bentley is reliably at his most leaden: an imaginative flight is likely to be brought low by a prosaic slingshot, because of the edition's severely pragmatic aesthetic: 'Whatever is beyond Possibility does not elevate the Stile, but depress it and make it ridiculous.' 31 This difference in sensibility is at least partly cultural: the habit of thinking poetically, of structuring ideas and emotions rhetorically and analogically, was for Milton very deeply ingrained, and for Bentley, half a century later, alien if not primitive. 32 Bentley did not have a natural understanding of such mechanisms of accommodation, and many of his revisions are unsuccessful because they are premised on a principle of translatability -from figurative to literal with nothing forfeited -that is simply inadequate to the rhetorical complexity of Paradise Lost.
The rationalist in Bentley is, too, inclined to be disturbed by the exploits of angels. A significant revision, and a notorious moment for scholars, is his brazen interpolation towards the end of Book IV. Satan, disguised, breaches the bower of the sleeping Adam and susceptible Eve to contaminate her dreams with disturbing thoughts; he is surprised there by Ithuriel, a touch of whose truth-dealing spear restores his original shape. Here is Milton: Bentley is bothered by the whole episode, from the intrusion into the bower's sanctity to the magically metamorphosing spear. He cannot really make sense of the action, so decides to give the angel some help in identifying Satan: 'why may I not add one Verse to Milton, as well as his Editor add so many', he questions, before intervening with a rather galumphing pentameter:
Him thus intent Ithuriel with his Spear, Knowing no real Toad durst there intrude Touch'd lightly. Bentley's contribution here is 'like dogs who cannot bear not to join in the singing'. 35 This slyly affectionate remark of Empson's recognises both the crassness of the intrusion at this point (the irony of its context is implicit) and the subtle impulse behind it: the critic is motivated not, as he has claimed, by the desire to emend, but by the desire to collaborate.
And by the desire to converse. Figurative aversion notwithstanding, one of the work's peculiarities is how much of Bentley's edition is structured as a kind of unfolding dialogue that is fundamentally rhetorical in a slightly different sense: with the amanuensis, the editor -that necessary but wholly imaginary figure -with the printer, or the poet, or with contemporary critics and projected readers.
36 'Thinking', Michael Billig recognises, 'is not merely the silent argument of the soul with itself, but, even more frequently, it is the noisier argument of one individual with another. And rhetoric, as the traditional study and practice of argumentation, provides an entry to an understanding of thinking.' 37 As an exercise in staged thought, then, the 1732 Paradise Lost is rhetorical to the last degree: Bentley needs his invented pantheon to stimulate and justify his interventions, and the characters imagined as surrounding the work and its processes of transmission are realised with almost the vivid exactitude of Milton's own. Bentley gives a contemptuous thumbnail sketch of his chief butt: 'by all his Insertions compar'd together', he deduces, '[our Editor] appears an injudicious Smatterer in Astronomy, Geography, Poetical Story, and old Romances'. 38 The traces he seeks in the text are those of an alien sensibility: someone who never existed, in whose existence, indeed, there must be some doubt over whether Bentley himself believed, is invested with a personality and a set of complementary interests in order that he might assume a shape that can be argued with and 35 Empson, 'Milton and Bentley', p. 156. 36 Haugen points out, in particular, Bentley's engagement with the seminal essays on Paradise Lost by Joseph Addison that were published in the Spectator in 1712: 'When the poem itself was the subject of discussion -more specifically, when individual passages were the subject of discussion -Bentley and Addison could engage in genuine dialogue' (Richard Bentley: Poetry and Enlightenment, p. 223). Her terms here recognise the importance of notional conversation to Bentley's methods (Addison died thirteen years before the edition was published). 37 defeated. 39 Once or twice, Bentley's argumentative energy outstrips its legitimate bounds, and he allows himself regretfully to wonder whether the errors he detects are in fact Milton's; ''Tis difficult here to excuse the Poet himself ', he decides at one point: 'no pragmatical Editor can come here to acquit him. 'Tis credible, that for Joy he was finishing his Second Book, he relax'd his Attention, and forgot his own System.' Half a book later, there is another perceived failure of coherence: 'Our Author, if it's He, forgets himself.' 40 On each of these occasions, the implication is that only a severe mental abstraction could explain a seeming inconsistency; Milton must 'forget himself ' to deviate from Bentley's rigid sense of the poem's internal logic. The critic's rationalizations are not psychologically credible, but the strength of his desire to believe in the absolute integrity of the mind with which he imagines himself in communication comes across clearly. Even stronger than that desire, however, is an adversarial urge so powerful it comes close rupturing the flimsy fiction of the 'Editor' which is supposed to screen Milton from his scorn.
These moments in the editorial notes to Paradise Lost are striking above all for the immediacy of their engagement. Bentley, as he nitpicks his way through the 800 or so major corrections he made to the text of the poem, is actually doing something quite remarkable: he is inviting the reader into what is in effect a real-time re-creation of the instant of thought and transmission. Bentley is interested in the utterly mundane and the intensely intimate: the word distorted on a breath of air, fumbled or blotted on the page. He interchanges words with similar sounds ('Creator' for 'greater'), shuffles letters around to get a better fit: 'he no less' is anagrammatized into 'Lesson He'. 41 What, Bentley asks himself, sounds like this unsatisfactory word, that an amanuensis might have mistaken it for? and that Milton might have misheard a second time, when the proofs were read back to him? Milton hardly got half a dozen lines before his attention strayed, it seems; 'the secret top of Horeb' is nonsense as far as Bentley is concerned, because the tops of mountains are clearly visible from some distance away; 'Our poet dictated it thus, That on the SACRED better, That, I say, was dictated by Milton.' 42 This is disingenuous: Bentley is in fact rather more interested in his own sense than in Milton's, and he lapses very frequently into a tone of admonition: 'the Construction is vitious', he tuts; 'he had better have said this'; 'had he not better have given it thus?' 43 Phrases formed in the mind are in danger, it seems, as soon as they take shape in speech, and they are if anything more vulnerable in the act of transcription. The more Bentley thinks about the accidents that might happen, the more foolish it appears to rely on anyone's competence; 'Here has been miserable Work by the Amanuensis', he writes, while adjusting and transposing two lines from Book IX, 'whoever He or She was, that copied from his Mouth. And a Wonder it happen'd no oftener; a blind Man dictating, and if upon Recollection altering, Blots and Interlines the necessary Consequence.' 44 Bentley's conjectural licence is of course predicated on a circumstance that is imponderable but unignorable in any account of cognitive process in Paradise Lost, the poet's blindness. That last quotation demonstrates an unexpected impulse to empathy, as well as that characteristic close interest in the physiological ('his Mouth'). Empathy is a quality few have found in the edition, but it is there nonetheless -if spasmodically, and not without an underpinning of self-interest ('our Poet, blind, and then poor and friendless, had frequently foul Play', which sad circumstance provides a justification for later interventions). 45 Bentley strains to catch the echoes of long-vanished accents: to think himself back some seventy years to the scene of composition, and to hear and watch what was said and written. 'I wonder', he writes in the preface, 'that confin'd in a narrow and to Him a dark Chamber, surrounded with Cares and Fears, he could spatiate at large through the Compass of the whole Universe, and through all Heaven beyond it.' 46 This wonder, though it might be expressed as a thoroughly disapproving scepticism, is evident throughout the edition. Notions of space and perspective trouble him, as that odd word 'spatiate' admits; but Bentley's studied incomprehension does falter for just a moment as he feels his way towards Milton's own account of his predicament in the invocation to Book VII:
Standing on Earth, not rapt above the Pole, More safe I Sing with mortal voice, unchang'd 42 Ibid., p. 1. 43 Ibid., pp. 38, 19, 71. 44 Ibid., p. 278. 45 Ibid., p. 10. 46 Ibid., preface (unpaginated); italics reversed.
To hoarce or mute, though fall'n on evil dayes, On evil dayes though fall'n, and evil tongues; In darkness, and with dangers compast round, And solitude. 47 Bentley's 'Surrounded' and 'Compass' pick up 'compassed round', and the sudden movement from a shuttered mind in a cramped study to the farthest reaches of creation is distinctively Milton's own. Empson's robust defence of the 1732 Paradise Lost, by way of a sideways smack at Milton, is suggestive in this context; 'it is refreshing', he writes, 'to see the irruption of his firm sense into Milton's world of harsh and hypnotic, superb and crotchety isolation'. 48 Bentley throws open the door of the narrow chamber, but his coming brings with it the petrifying light of eighteenthcentury logic: by the time he arrives at the moment in the text that moved and coloured his prefatory comments, the fragile sympathetic connection is lost. 'This Epithet, Mortal, by no means can be admitted here', he asserts. 
Was his Voice
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Bentley disputes with figments of his own imagination, and once again the poet himself seems inadvertently implicated; the customary careful excuses ('Here he gave it right, but Printer or Hearer mistook him') are absent from this note. 50 Sarcastic questions barely conceal an impatience at ideas that seem to Bentley unnatural, illogical; his mind balks at following Milton's, and his limping alternatives -'mortal' changed to 'lofty', 'mute' to 'low' -are an implicit reproach to the poet's conceptual nerve.
More significant even than these rebukes, direct or implied, are the moments when Bentley forgets himself into an imagined present; 'he must 47 Paradise Lost (1674) VII. 23-8. 48 Empson, 'Milton and Bentley', p. 153. 49 Paradise Lost, ed. Bentley, p. 217. 50 Ibid., p. 173.
give it here', and again: 'he must give it thus'. 51 He slips in and out of a direct address to the illusory interpolator, and the degree of his outrage is measured in the tone of scoffing familiarity he uses. 'Pray you, Sir', he writes at one point; 'no more of your Patches in a Poem quite elevated above your Reach and Imitation.' 52 This, and other moments like it, is clearly staged, but such devices aim to make the edition seem a record of a spontaneous and unmediated confrontation with the text. The emphasis is shifted subtly from the drama of the poem to the footnotes' wranglings, and the critic himself, a confident mixture of erudition and intuition, takes centre stage. Milton's powerful personality has been splintered and refracted through a menagerie of other voices, his words attributed elsewhere: Bentley can thus become vitally involved in the meaning of the poem. He values his own contribution enough, even, to preserve the traces of his critical response: after puzzling for a paragraph over the description of angels eating at V. 637, he annotates his own note: 'I had writ this, before it came into my Mind, that this Passage was an Alteration made in the second Edition, publish'd 1674.' 53 Milton's thoughts and second thoughts are matched by Bentley's, and a complex dialogic layering results.
Marcus Walsh has suggested that Bentley's editing is not motivated by a desire to establish what the real poet John Milton really thought and wrote, but is instead orientated 'towards an ideal Milton, who might and should have written the ideal poem that Bentley's emendations, and, at last, re-writings, seek to re-construct'. 54 If this is true, he does not acknowledge it; invested in his own taste as test and surety, Bentley shows himself everywhere convinced that the real John Milton would really have preferred the poem the 1732 edition seeks definitively to establish. At one point he says as much: 'I do not disapprove Conspicuous', he writes at VI. 299; 'but if the Author had thought of it, I believe he would have prefer'd This before it … RESEMBLANCE' 55 But how quickly this project falls apart, spirals back on itself in helpless indeterminacy, can be seen from the earliest responses to the edition. Because Bentley's conversation with Milton is so easily overheard, and his editorial audacities invite defence or defensive conjecture, his edition starts to admit of as many versions of the poem as there are readers or readings -all depending on which of Bentley's corrections are accepted, which rejected, and which supplanted with the alternative emendation he sometimes requests. One of the first critics to charge into print, the anonymous author of Bentley Depos'd and Milton Restor'd, recognises the danger and opportunity of such an approach: 'The same liberty may be assumed by every Reader, as by you, Doctor' he cautions; 'and so the whole of Milton's, or any other poem, extinguished by degrees, and a new one set forth by Editors.' 56 This is supposed to sound like an absurdity, but Bentley's interventions bring the prospect of a poem whose meaning is fractured and diffused through each successive mind that considers it disturbingly close. As so often, Bentley here starts to look oddly modern in his effect, if not his methods.
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Private readers, too, sought to shore up the poem's meaning against this perceived attack; a copy of the 1732 edition in the library of Christ's College, Cambridge, once in the possession of the poet Cowper, takes frequent marginal issue with the by now notorious editorial innovations.
Cowper is writing at more or less the same distance from Bentley as Bentley is from Milton, about sixty years, and his tone catches at some of the critic's immediacy and impatience.
58 'Such a botch as this is against Rules of Poetical Decorum', he cries at one of Bentley's fixes: 'Ridiculous Trifling!'; 'What a hobbling inharmonious line is here!' 59 There is even an imaginative reconstruction of Bentley's method: when the editor turns 'fierce hosting' to 'fierce JOUSTING' on the grounds that he 'does not remember to have met with the word HOSTING either in Verse or Prose', Cowper rises to some scornful ventriloquism: 'I (Doctor Bentley) never met with this before -Ergo -the Author never made use of this 56 Quoted in Walsh, Shakespeare, Milton & Eighteenth-Century Literary Editing, pp. 76-7. 57 Something recognised in Kolbrener's argument: 'Bentley's instructions to the reader, encouraging him to exercise his "free-choice", seem a humbler eighteenth-century version of Fish's "reader-response"'. Milton 62 We would now think of this as punning; since the Augustan era, it has fallen out of favour as a rhetorical figure. Addison points out numerous instances of its use in Paradise Lost in his Spectator essays, and Bentley follows the lead of the 'ingenious Gentleman, who had a settled Aversion to all Puns, as they are call'd', in altering it whenever he sees it:
The affected Jingle here of Bound and Bound has been blam'd deservedly. But it may easily be remedied;
At one slight bound high overleap'd all FENCE.
Or thus;
At one slight EFFORT overleap'd all bound.
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Or almost whenever: at II. 190, God is allowed to 'View all things at one view' until Cowper comes along. 'I wonder Bentley who seems to abhorr Jingle so much did not take notice of this & alter it thus -Views all things at one Glance or Ken', he suggests. 64 The point of this is to illustrate how seductive is Bentley's model of the ideal, how winning his conviction, or at least his convenient fiction, that an error or a lapse might be caught and corrected on its way from the poet's mouth to the scribe's pen, even if its particular manifestations are rejected -as they are for the most part by Cowper. Bentley's ways of reading are catching, because they seem to promise an access to intellectual processes that should be as lost as the moment in which they occurred. He disregards mental boundaries and historical estrangement in pursuit of a text whose truth he upholds, even as he works against its integrity.
The poem for Bentley is not an inert record of past thought, but something that can be argued or negotiated with, disputed and evolved, and whoever opens his edition is drawn into that dynamic. Though he may not have approved the precise form it takes here, the animating notion behind Bentley's revisions was a familiar and important one to Milton; in Areopagitica he writes that 'books are not absolutely dead things'; that 'they do preserve as in a violl the purest efficacie and extraction of that living intellect that bred them'. 65 Bentley takes him at his word. He insists on sharing the page with Milton, whom he addresses as a living, and sometimes quite aggravating, intellect; his corrective italics obtrude, but they do not efface the original lines, so the reader is confronted with a continual responsibility of choice. 66 It is in some ways immaterial that the choice is seldom very difficult: Milton was the better poet, and Bentley never reaches this ideal of intellectual collaboration; nor do more than a couple of the revisions out of all his many hundreds make a lasting mark on the text. 67 The project fails on Bentley's own terms partly because he himself doesn't realise, or at least will not acknowledge, how ambitious it is. His continual evasions about the truth of what it is he is trying to do give rise to something that as a work of philological scholarship is contradictory, inconsistent, and careless; as a creative act however, and an exercise in aspirational rethinking, Bentley's 1732 Paradise Lost is a much more interesting proposition.
One of the poem's most famous phrases is also the occasion for one of Bentley's most notorious emendations; the 'darkness visible' that 'Serv'd onely to discover sights of woe '. 68 This is unimaginable, oxymoronic: Milton reaches to the edges of expression to find a description for the quality of the atmosphere in Hell, one that will register its terrible novelty not just for the reader, but for the angels still stunned from their nine days' fall into the sulphurous abyss that will be their home for eternity. Predictably, the figure gave Bentley vertigo, and he revised it to 'a transpicuous Gloom'; careful, as always, to cite precedents for his choice from elsewhere, but deaf to the deadening effect of the change on Milton's imaginative landscape.
69 Where Milton's figure pushes at the boundaries of conception, thinks itself, in fact, into an entirely new metaphorical space, Bentley's alternative stands cautiously back on the firm ground of the literal and the known. The leap that 'darkness visible' makes is, like the greatest of Milton's feats of cognitive rhetoric, immediately understood but resistant to complete explanation: it asks instead for an intuitive assent and in so doing influences the perception of those it works on. Though the terms might have been unfamiliar to him, Milton's poetry is animated by the assumption that the cognitive abilities that govern how language works and those that govern how the mind works are not significantly distinct, and this insight makes itself felt in the force of his rhetoric. Bentley, when he comes to retrace them from a rationalist eighteenth-century vantage, falters in Milton's steps: chiefly, as this essay has sought to demonstrate, because of a marked deficiency in rhetorical understanding, partly cultural and partly temperamental. In the end, Bentley's engagement with Paradise Lost represents both a fascinating historicised model of cognitive response and a structure of reading -one that privileges correct syntax, propriety, literalism, massed scholarship -that seeks to compete with this model, but is ultimately defeated by it.
